As in 2014, New Delhi\u2019s close relations with both Moscow and Washington put it in a delicate diplomatic bind. Why India Is Silent on the Ukraine Crisis Indian Foreign Policy Topic<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
The highlights this week: The\u00a0Ukraine<\/a> crisis<\/strong>\u00a0puts India in a diplomatic bind, Norway hosts a conference with\u00a0Taliban officials<\/strong>, and South Asia fares poorly in new\u00a0global corruption rankings<\/a><\/strong>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n What the Ukraine Crisis<\/a> Means for India<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n As most of the world watches for a possible Russian invasion<\/a> of Ukraine, India has maintained a cautious silence. The crisis puts New Delhi in a difficult diplomatic position.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n India doesn\u2019t want to upset its long<\/a>-standing relations with Russia<\/a> by trying to rein it in, but an invasion of Ukraine would also spell disaster for its strategic interests. The crisis puts New Delhi under pressure from Washington to join<\/a> the coalition of countries opposing Moscow\u2019s military mobilization. The more<\/a> things escalate, the more challenges<\/a> India will face as it tries to balance relations with both countries.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n India\u2019s friendship with Russia harks back<\/a> to the early years of the Cold<\/a> War. Officials in New Delhi consider Moscow a\u00a0time-tested\u00a0and\u00a0reliable\u00a0partner. During India\u2019s devastating COVID-19 surge last year, many Indian observers noted that it was Russia\u2014not the United States\u2014that immediately came to India\u2019s<\/a> aid. Tellingly, India was silent when Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014, and it abstained from a United Nations resolution upholding Ukraine\u2019s territorial integrity.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n This time around, New Delhi will also be hard-pressed to push back against Moscow\u2014and not just out of nostalgia. Russia is a\u00a0top arms supplier\u00a0to India, which risked U.S. sanctions<\/a> by purchasing a Russian S-400 missile<\/a> defense system<\/a> that began arriving\u00a0last month. To New Delhi, Moscow also\u00a0makes\u00a0a\u00a0major contribution\u00a0to a multipolar world order with power dispersed beyond Washington and Beijing. This, too, makes India more likely to stay quiet about Russia\u2019s actions in Ukraine and elsewhere.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n Like many countries, India won\u2019t call out the excesses of other governments if doing so could damage its interests. Its reaction to last year\u2019s coup in Myanmar was\u00a0muted, seeking to avoid jeopardizing relations with a military regime that cooperates with India on border security and infrastructure projects. New Delhi recently\u00a0introduced\u00a0a new plan for engagement with the junta, which it doesn\u2019t want to get any closer to Beijing.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n Yet another Russian invasion of Ukraine would deliver major blows to Indian<\/a> interests, as\u00a0Tanvi Madan\u00a0and\u00a0Pranab Dhal Samanta\u00a0have each argued in recent essays. The resulting Western sanctions would make Moscow more reliant on economic<\/a> assistance from Beijing\u2014ultimately undermining the multipolarity<\/a> sought by New Delhi. Fresh sanctions would also present obstacles for India\u2019s defense trade with Russia.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n Furthermore, the crisis in Ukraine could distract the United<\/a> States from its focus on countering<\/a> Chinese power. Meanwhile, Beijing could capitalize by intensifying provocations in the South China<\/a> Sea or even along the India-China border\u2014outcomes that would deliver fresh blows to New Delhi\u2019s interests. These possibilities highlight how the Russia factor could constrain U.S.-India relations.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n The United States is aware of India\u2019s<\/a> concerns about impending military action. Since the last time Russia<\/a> invaded Ukraine<\/a>, both Moscow and New Delhi have each scaled up relations with the other\u2019s rivals: Russia with Pakistan and China and India with the United States. The United States may see a strong<\/a> statement of concern from India\u2014as a close friend of Russia and a key non-NATO actor\u2014as a powerful message.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n Such a move could help India\u2019s cause as it seeks a U.S. sanctions waiver for the S-400 purchase\u2014matters that were likely discussed during a Jan. 20\u00a0call\u00a0between Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman. Predictably, a U.S. readout said Russia was an agenda point, while India\u2019s readout didn\u2019t mention Russia.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n A full-scale, extended war is the worst-case scenario for India: It would<\/a> make its role as a silent bystander untenable. But even a more limited Russian military intervention would likely result in a sanctioned Moscow, a strengthened Beijing, and a distracted Washington\u2014all costly for New Delhi\u2019s interests. India could move the needle by urging Russia to use restraint, but it may deem even that modest move too risky.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n